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LAW WEST OF THE PECOS: THE
GROWTH OF THE WISE-USE MOVEMENT
AND THE CHALLENGE TO FEDERAL
PUBLIC LAND-USE POLICY
I. INTRODUCrION
On July 4, 1994, Nye County, Nevada Supervisor Richard
Carver mounted a county bulldozer and attempted to open a road
through the Toiyabe National Forest, "forcing at least one federal
ranger to leap out of his path."' On March 30, 1995, a pipe bomb
blew out windows at the U.S. Forest Service office in Carson City,
Nevada, and "[o]n Halloween 1993, a bomb was thrown onto the
roof of Bureau of Land Management headquarters in Reno.",
2
Environmentalists in Washington, New Mexico, Texas, and Mon-
tana have received death threats, and assailants painted a hammer
and sickle on Forest Service offices in Catron County, New Mex-
ico.3
Increasingly, federal employees are taking precautions.
Fish and Wildlife has stripped insignias off its cars. Forest
Service employees are shedding their brown uniforms in
favor of more discrete civilian clothes. In some troubled
areas, they travel only in pairs. The Forest Service also
recently issued employees cards with the phone numbers
of the local U.S. attorney's office in case they are jailed or
detained by local officials.4
These events are among the more radical manifestations of a
growing movement in the rural areas of several western states to
controvert or even defy the authority of the federal government in
1. Marianne Lavelle, 'Wise-Use' Movement Grows, NAT'L L.J., June 5, 1995, at
Al, A22.
2. Alex Barnum, Battle Over US. Land Gets Nasty, Personal, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 14, 1995, at Al, All.
3. Mary Hanna, 'Frenzy Politics' Descends on Nature Lovers: The Anti-
Abortion Movement's Scare Tactics Now Threaten the Guardians of the Environment,
L.A. TIMEs, July 16, 1995, at M5.
4. Barnum, supra note 2, at Al, All.
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order to "take back" public lands, placing them under local rather
than federal control.
5
At the forefront of this challenge to federal authority over
federal lands, the so-called "Wise-Use movement" first emerged
on the national scene in 1989, touting "a volatile mix of traditional
conservative ideology blended with some revolutionary proposals
to open public lands to greater private exploitation., 6 Well-funded
and well-organized, the Wise-Use movement represents a coalition
of property owners, natural resource industries, trade associations,
and conservative political interest groups, all of whom profess an
ideological and economic interest in the continued utilization of
public lands.7
The movement was launched by Alan M. Gottlieb, "a direct-
mail fund-raiser for conservative politicians and causes, especially
his Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms."
8
Gottlieb created a new organization, the Center for the Defense of
Free Enterprise, and sponsored the Multiple Use Strategy Confer-
ence in Reno, Nevada in August of 1988. Among the more than
200 groups and individuals that participated in the conference
were the National Inholders Association, representing owners of
private property in or near national parks and forests, the Wilder-
ness Impact Research Foundation, representing grazing and other
commercial interests on public lands, and the Blue Ribbon Coali-
tion, representing users and manufacturers of off-road recreational
vehicles."0 The list of conference supporters also included natural
resource corporations such as Boise-Cascade, Georgia Pacific, and
Exxon U.S.A., as well as various industry trade associations such
as the National Association of Wheat Growers, the Nevada Miners
and Prospectors Association, and the Western Wood Products As-
sociation." Participants in the conference presented more than
5. Hanna, supra note 3, at MS.
6. LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE: WISE USE AND THE PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 11 (John D. Echeverria & Raymond Booth Eby eds., 1995).
7. Tarso Ramos, Wise Use in the West, in LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE: WISE USE
AND THE PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 6, at 82,82.
8. Thomas A. Lewis, Cloaked in a Wise Disguise, in LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE:
WISE USE AND THE PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 6, at 13, 15.
9. Ramos, supra note 7, at 82-83.
10. Margaret Kriz, Land Mine, in LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE: WISE USE AND THE
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 6, at 27, 29; Lewis, supra note 8,
at 16.
11. Ramos, supra note 7, at 83.
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100 papers, which were later published as a "Wise-Use Agenda.,
12
"This document called for a number of initiatives, including:
opening 'all public lands including wilderness and national parks to
oil drilling, logging, and commercial development;' immediate oil
and gas development of Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge;
liquidation of all old-growth forests; and privatization of public
rangelands."13
Other groups with connections to the Wise-Use movement
include the Alliance for America, a national umbrella organization
that represents such interests as the National Cattlemen's Asso-
ciation; the Oregon Lands Coalition, an organization linked to ag-
ricultural, ranching, and timber interests that champions efforts to
limit federal protections for endangered species; and the Western
States Public Lands Coalition and its subsidiary, People for the
West!, which was formed by mining companies in an effort to im-
prove their industry's public image, fight efforts to reform federal
mining laws, and help organize grassroots groups in communities
that are dependent on grazing, logging, and mining on federal
lands.
14
With annual budgets that range anywhere from $100,000 to
$1.7 million, 5 the various groups that make up the Wise-Use
movement "generally fall into two categories: those that promote
private property rights and those that support resource extraction
on public lands.... The property rights groups.., want to expand
the rights of property owners to gain compensation when the gov-
ernment restricts the use of their lands."16 Meanwhile "[t]he other
wing of the movement.., argues that the [government] is threat-
ening their lifestyles by trying to restrict grazing, logging, mining,
recreation, and other activities on federal lands.""
Wise-Use advocates employ a number of arguments in sup-
port of their positions. These arguments fall into two general
12. Lewis, supra note 8, at 16.
13. Id. at 16-17.
14. Kriz, supra note 10, at 28-29; see also Martin Van Der Werf & Steve Yoz-
wiak, New War for the West: Lobbying Group Fights to Expand Development of
Land's Resources, ARIz. REPUBLIC, July 3, 1994, at Al (providing a detailed discus-
sion of the goals, activities, organizational structure, and industry connections of
People for the West!).
15. Kriz, supra note 10, at 29.
16. Id. at 31-32.
17. Id- at 32.
18. See Anita P. Miller, The Western Front Revisited, 26 URB. LAW. 845 (1994)
(discussing various legal approaches that Wise-Use advocates have adopted). "As
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classifications. The first is the property rights argument, "which
holds that increased environmentally oriented regulation of public
lands constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking when economic ac-
tivities of public land users are adversely affected."' 9 The second is
the county supremacy argument, which holds that "county gov-
ernments have virtually a veto power over.., regulation when it
adversely impacts the economic interests of counties and their
residents.
2 1
In the following pages both of these arguments will be exam-
ined in some detail, and they will be shown to lack any firm legal
basis in the context of current federal land-use policy. However, in
order fully to understand the nature of the controversy surround-
ing the control of federal lands, it is first necessary to understand
something of the nature and development of federal land-use pol-
icy, particularly as it applies to those states west of the Rocky
Mountains. Accordingly, Part II of this Comment presents a brief
history of the development of federal land-use policy in the west-
ern United States. Part III then examines the legal basis of the
property rights argument, especially in light of recent Supreme
Court decisions concerning regulatory takings, and Part IV exam-
ines the county supremacy argument. Finally, Part V discusses
ways in which Congress and the federal agencies should respond to
the Wise-Use philosophy while still protecting the legacy of our
public lands for the greater good.
II. BACKGROUND
The United States owns in fee approximately 650 million acres
or roughly twenty-nine percent of the nation's total land area of
2.3 billion acres.2 Excluding lands used for such purposes as de-
fense installations and post offices, federal lands are classified into
five systems managed by four federal agencies in two executive
departments.22 The National Park System, administered by the
National Park Service (NPS) under the Department of the Inte-
one legal strategy is disposed of by the courts, another leaps up to take its place." Id.
at 857.
19. Anita P. Miller, America's Public Lands: Legal Issues in the New War for the
West, 24 URB. LAW. 895, 897 (1992).
20. Id. at 897-98.
21. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, 177 PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 1992 1
(1993).
22. GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAW § 2.04 (2d ed. 1995).
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rior, encompasses approximately 80 million acres of national parks
and monuments.z' The National Forest System, administered by
the United States Forest Service (USFS) under the Department of
Agriculture, encompasses approximately 190 million acres of na-
tional forest.24 The National Wildlife Refuge System, administered
by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) under the
Department of the Interior, encompasses approximately 90 million
acres.' 5 An additional 260 million acres that were neither home-
steaded nor reserved for federal conservation purposes are admin-
istered by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) under the De-
partment of the Interior.26 Finally, the system of wilderness areas,
scenic rivers, and national trails is superimposed on the pre-
existing systems and is administered by the agency responsible for
the lands on which individual portions of the system occur.
Although federal public lands are located in all states, they are
concentrated in the eleven westernmost contiguous states and
Alaska.2 These lands became part of the public domain through a
variety of transactions. Original grants from Great Britain to the
colonies of Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, Virginia,
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. The disposition of federal public lands in Alaska is an interesting topic well
worth further study; however, because the Wise-Use movement has thus far largely
occupied itself with conditions in the lower forty-eight states, it is not a topic that this
Comment seeks to address. The distribution of public lands within those states with
which this Comment is primarily concerned is as follows:
Total Acreage Total Acreage of Percent
State Owned by Fed- State Owned by
eral Gov't Federal Gov't
Arizona 34,235,605.0 72,688,000 47.1
California 44,541,202.2 100,206,720 44.5
Colorado 24,069,202.4 66,485,760 36.2
Idaho 32,672,007.0 52,933,120 61.7
Montana 26,142,802.0 93,271,040 28.0
Nevada 58,134,543.8 70,264,320 82.7
New Mexico 25,728,629.0 77,766,400 33.1
Oregon 28,756,761.2 61,598,720 46.7
Utah 33,620,182.9 52,696,960 63.8
Washington 12,374,262.7 42,693,760 29.0
Wyoming 30,415,720.1 62,343,040 48.8
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, supra note 21, at 5.
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North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia purported to grant
all land within fixed latitudes from the Atlantic to the Pacific
Ocean.29 These grants were later reduced in 1763 when Great
Britain recognized Spanish claims west of the Mississippi River.
3 1
Following the Revolution, however, Maryland, by refusing to sign
the Articles of Confederation, led five other states that had no
western lands in an effort to force the larger states to place their
western lands under federal control.31 Roughly 230 million acres
thereby became the property of the federal government.3 2 Begin-
ning with the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and ending with the
Alaska Purchase in 1867, the United States acquired by means of
purchase and conquest an additional 1.5 billion acres33 or roughly
seventy-five percent of the total land area of the country.
A. Traditional Land-Use Policy
Unless the government shall grant head rights,.., these
prairies, with their gorgeous growth of flowers, their
green carpeting, their lovely lawns and gentle slopes, will
for centuries continue to be the home of the "wild deer
and wolf;" their stillness will be undisturbed by the jocund
song of the farmer, and their deep and fertile soil unbro-
ken by his ploughshare. Something must be done to rem-
edy this evil.4
For the first 150 years, the official land policy of the United
States government was to exploit the federal lands, first for the
purpose of generating revenue 5 and, subsequently, for the purpose
of settlement.36 The Land Ordinance of 17853 represents the first
attempt by the Continental Congress to address the disposition of
the public lands. Motivated primarily by the need to raise revenue
for the fledgling government,38 the Land Ordinance of 1785 "laid
29. PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 49(1968).
30. Id
31. Id. at 50.
32. Id. at 55.
33. Id. at 86.
34. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1845) (statement of Rep. Ficklin).
35. See PHILLIP O. Foss, POLITICS AND GRASS 12-13 (1960); GATES, supra note
29, at 61.
36. See Foss, supra note 35, at 19.
37. Land Ordinance of 1785, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY
123 (Henry S. Commager ed., 7th ed. 1963) [hereinafter Commager].
38. GATES, supra note 29, at 63.
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the foundations for the public land system, followed in most es-
sentials until 1862."'9 The Ordinance provided for the systematic
survey of the public land in townships six miles square, divided
into thirty-six sections of one square mile, or 640 acres each. The
land was to be auctioned at a minimum purchase price of one dol-
lar per acre with a minimum purchase of 640 acres.4° "Henceforth
until 1841, newly surveyed land could not be bought from the gov-
ernment until first offered at public auction ....... The Ordinance
included no limitations on the amount of land individuals or com-
panies could purchase.42 Neither settlement nor construction of
improvements on the land were required for purchase,43 nor were
preemption rights granted to squatters." In addition to these
measures, one section per township was to be reserved and sold to
pay for the maintenance of public schools in the township,45 and
"one-third part of all gold, silver, lead and copper mines, [were] to
be sold, or otherwise disposed of as Congress shall hereafter di-
rect.
, 46
The Land Ordinance of 1785 led to the enactment of the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787,4' which established the framework
for the creation and admission of new states "to a share in the
Federal councils on an equal footing with the original States." 41 Of
special significance are the provisions in the Ordinance that pro-
hibit the legislatures in the new states from interfering with "the
primary disposal of the soil by the United States in Congress as-
sembled, nor with any regulations Congress may find necessary for
securing the title in such soil to the bona fide purchasers.,
49
Moreover, "[n]o tax shall be imposed on land the property of the
United States."5
39. Commager, supra note 37, at 123.
40. Id at 123-24.
41. GATES, supra note 29, at 65.
42. Id. at 66.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Commager, supra note 37, at 124.
46. Id.
47. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 957 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter Thorpe]. The North-
west Ordinance was subsequently re-enacted by the First Congress, Act of Aug. 7,
1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50.
48. Thorpe, supra note 47, at 960.
49. Id. at 961.
50. Id.
November 19961
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During subsequent decades Congress enacted a substantial
volume of legislation designed to further promote the orderly dis-
position of the western public lands. In order to accelerate the
settlement of the public lands, to raise revenue, and to discourage
speculation, Congress experimented with a number of measures,
including raising the minimum purchase price to as much as two
dollars an acre' while lowering the minimum purchase from 640
acres to 320 acres,52 then to 160 acres,53 80 acres,4 and finally to 40
acres.5 Congress also sought to discourage the practice of pre-
emption, "the preferential right of a settler-squatter to buy his
claim at a modest price without competitive bidding."5 6 The adop-
tion of the revenue policy for the public lands in 1785 and again in
the Land Act of 1796,5 and the system of sales of land only at
public auction, meant that intrusions of squatters could not be tol-
erated.58 In 1807 Congress went so far as to authorize the Presi-
dent "to employ such military force as he may judge necessary and
proper, to remove from lands.., secured to the United States,...
any person.., who shall hereafter take possession.., or attempt
to make a settlement thereon."59 Eventually, however, "Congress
gradually gave way to western pressures by relaxing the prohibi-
tions and penalties against intrusions, then by enacting measures
that forgave previous intrusions.'°
The Preemption Act of 18301 was enacted for one year and
applied only retroactively, but it served as the first general pre-
emption act insofar as it allowed every "settler or occupant" on
public lands who had been in possession and made improvements
on claims in 1829 to enter up to 160 acres at $1.25 per acre.62 Con-
51. Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 29, § 4, 1 Stat. 464,467; Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 55,
§ 5, 2 Stat. 73, 74; Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 35, § 5, 2 Stat. 277, 279.
52. Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 55,2 Stat. at 74.
53. Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 35,2 Stat. at 281.
54. Act of Apr. 24, 1820, ch. 51, § 1, 3 Stat. 566 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 672), re-
pealed by Act of Dec. 16, 1930, ch. 14, § 1, 46 Stat. 1029.
55. Act of Apr. 5, 1832, ch. 65, 4 Stat. 503 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 673), repealed
by Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 703(a), 90 Stat.
2743,2789 (1976).
56. GEORGE C. COGGINS & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND
AND RESOURCES LAW 67 (1981).
57. Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 464.
58. GATES, supra note 29, at 219.
59. Act of Mar. 3,1807, ch. 46, § 1, 2 Stat. 445.
60. GATES, supra note 29, at 220.
61. Preemption Act of 1830, ch. 208,4 Stat. 420.
62. Id.; GATES, supra note 29, at 225.
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gress finally enacted prospective preemption in 1841, allowing set-
tlers who inhabited and improved previously surveyed land to
claim 160 acres at $1.25 per acre.3 Beginning in 1853 Congress ex-
tended the right to preemption on unsurveyed land first to Cali-
fornia, then to Oregon and Washington Territories,5 then to
Kansas and Nebraska Territories," and finally to Minnesota Terri-
tory.67 In 1862 Congress authorized preemption on all remaining
unsurveyed federal land "to which the Indian title has been or
shall be extinguished."''
The Homestead Act of 186269 largely resolved the issue of
preemption first on surveyed land and, later, on unsurveyed land.7°
The Homestead Act entitled any persons who were heads of fami-
lies or at least twenty-one years of age, and who were citizens or
who had filed declarations to become citizens, to enter up to 160
acres of previously unappropriated land.7' After five years of ac-
tual residence and cultivation, settlers could take title to the land;
however, it was also possible for settlers to commute their home-
steads to preemption entries by paying the minimum purchase
price for the land "as provided by existing laws granting predmp-
tion rights., 72 Each settler could acquire only one homestead un-
der the Act, but because the preemption laws were still in effect,
one settler could acquire separately both a preemption and a
homestead, each consisting of 160 acres.73
Congress further sought to accomodate settlement on the
public lands by means of the Timber Culture Act of 1873, 74 which
allowed entry of an additional 160 acres, on forty acres of which
the settler was required to plant and cultivate trees for a period of
63. Act of Sept. 4, 1841, ch. 16, § 10, 5 Stat. 453, 455-56.
64. Act of Mar. 3, 1853, ch. 145, § 6, 10 Stat. 244, 246.
65. Act of July 17, 1854, ch. 84, § 3, 10 Stat. 305.
66. Act of July 22, 1854, ch. 103, § 12, 10 Stat. 308, 310.
67. Act of Aug. 4, 1854, ch. 249, 10 Stat. 576.
68. Preemption Act of 1862, ch. 94, § 1, 12 Stat. 413.
69. Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 43 U.S.C.), repealed by Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub.
L. No. 94-579, § 702, 90 Stat. 2743, 2787 (1976).
70. Act of May 14, 1880, ch. 89, § 3, 21 Stat. 140, 141 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §
166), repealed by Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, §
702, 90 Stat. 2743, 2787 (1976).
71. Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392.
72. Id. at 393.
73. GATEs, supra note 29, at 395.
74. Timber Culture Act, ch. 277, 17 Stat. 605 (1873).
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ten years.75 Because residence was not required,76 it was possible
for one settler to enter a timber claim and either a homestead or a
preemption claim at the same time. By commuting a homestead to
a preemption, entering a second homestead, and applying for an
additional claim under the Timber Culture Act, one settler could
acquire possession of up to 480 acres of land.77
Convinced that further measures were required to promote
settlement in the arid and semi-arid lands west of the 100th merid-
ian, Congress passed the Desert Land Act of 1877,78 which allowed
entry on 640 acres at $1.25 an acre if the claimant could offer proof
at the end of three years that the land had been reclaimed for irri-
gation." The Enlarged Homestead Acte' followed in 1909, allow-
ing entry on 320 acres instead of 160 acres west of the 100th merid-
ian, and in 1916 the Stock Raising Homestead Act8' allowed entry
on 640 acres of land designated for grazing.
"In the haphazard development of land legislation Congress
had never devised a policy for timberlands. Instead, it had allowed
all laws such as cash sale, . . . preemption, . . . and homestead to
apply to them as to all other lands when offered."" Not until 1878
did Congress enact legislation specifically addressing the disposi-
tion of existing timber resources on the public lands, and even then
the effect was largely to legitimize prior abuses. 3 The Timber and
Stone Act of 1878"4 provided that
surveyed public lands of the United States within the
States of California, Oregon and Nevada and in Washing-
ton Territory, ... valuable chiefly for timber, but unfit for
cultivation, . . . may be sold to citizens of the United
States, or persons who have declared their intention to
75. Id. at 605-06.
76. GATES, supra note 29, at 399.
77. Id at 400 n.27.
78. Desert Land Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 321-339 (1994)).
79. GATES, supra note 29, at 401.
80. Enlarged Homestead Act, ch. 160,35 Stat. 639 (1909) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §
218), repealed by Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, §
702, 90 Stat. 2743, 2788 (1976).
81. Stock Raising Homestead Act, ch. 9, 39 Stat. 862 (1916) (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-298), repealed by Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 702, 90 Stat. 2743, 2789 (1976).
82. GATES, supra note 29, at 417.
83. See COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 56, at 118-19.
84. Timber and Stone Act, ch. 151, 17 Stat. 89 (1878) (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. H8 311-313), repealed by Act of Aug. 1, 1955, ch. 448, 69 Stat. 434.
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become such, in quantities not exceeding one hundred
and sixty acres... at the minimum price of two dollars
and fifty cents per acre; and lands valuable chiefl for
stone may be sold on the same terms as timber lands.
The Act also made it illegal "to cut, or cause or procure to be cut,.
. any timber growing on any lands of the United States,.. or re-
move, or cause to be removed, any timber from said public
lands." 6 The Act further provided, however, that
any person prosecuted in said States and Territory...
may be relieved from further prosecution and liability
therefor upon payment.., of the sum of two dollars and
fifty cents per acre for all lands on which he shall have cut
or caused to be cut timber, or removed or caused to be
removed the same. 7
In 1892 Congress extended the provisions of the Timber and Stone
Act to "all the public-land States.""
The Timber and Stone Act also provided that "none of the
rights conferred by the act approved July twenty-sixth, eighteen
hundred and sixty-six, entitled 'An act granting the right of way to
ditch and canal owners over the public lands, and for other pur-
poses', shall be abrogated by this act."89 The Act of July 26, 1866,90
in spite of its title, was the first significant attempt by Congress to
address mining on the public lands. Prior to 1866 Congress had
failed to adopt a consistent policy for the disposition of mineral re-
sources on the public lands.9' Although the Land Ordinance of
1785 had reserved "one-third part of all gold, silver, lead and cop-
per mines, to be sold, or otherwise disposed of as Congress shall
hereafter direct,"' ' Congress never incorporated such language
into the various land acts that it enacted following ratification of
the Constitution.93 After an unsuccessful attempt to lease lead
85. Id.
86. Id. at 90.
87. Id
88. Act of Aug. 4, 1892, ch. 375, § 2, 27 Stat. 348 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 311),
repealed by Act of Aug. 1, 1955, ch. 448,69 Stat. 434.
89. Timber and Stone Act, ch. 151, 17 Stat. at 89.
90. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.
§§ 43-46,51 (1994) & 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1994)).
91. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND AND RE-
SOURCE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS 244 (1987).
92. Commager, supra note 37, at 124.
93. Robert W. Swenson, Legal Aspects of Mineral Resources Exploitation, in
GATES, supra note 29, at 701-02.
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mines in the upper Mississippi valley,94 Congress in 1846 opened
mineral lands to public sale and preemption, though on somewhat
different terms than those for agricultural lands.95
The Mining Act of 1866 declared the "mineral lands of the
public domain, both surveyed and unsurveyed .... to be free and
open to exploration and occupation."9 Any person filing a claim,
"having previously occupied and improved the same according to
the local custom or rules of miners in the district where the same is
situated, and having expended in actual labor ...thereon an
amount of not less than one thousand dollars," 97 could, upon pay-
ment of five dollars per acre, "enter such tract and receive a patent
therefor, granting such mine, together with the right to follow such
vein or lode.., to any depth, although it may enter the land ad-
joining."98 The Act of July 9, 18709 enlarged the rights of claim-
ants on mineral lands and extended the provisions of the Act of
1866 to surface mining claims, or placers. Under the 1870 Act
each claimant could acquire up to 160 acres at a cost of $2.50 per
acre.
100
The General Mining Act of 18721 largely codified and con-
solidated the previous acts while making various substantive
changes designed primarily to simplify the procedure for obtaining
patents. 2 The basic policy of "free and open" exploration and ac-
quisition was retained, however, and the Mining Act of 1872 re-
mains the principal statutory provision governing mining activity
on the public lands.0 3
B. Modern Land-Use Policy
The approach to the management of the public lands began to
change with the passage of the General Revision Act of 1891214
94. Id- at 702-06.
95. Id. at 706.
96. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251.
97. Id. at 251-52.
98. Id. at 252.
99. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§
35-38,52 (1994) & 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1994)).
100. Id.
101. General Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 30 U.S.C. (1994)).
102. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 91, at 244.
103. COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 56, at 87.
104. General Revision Act of 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. (1994), 30 U.S.C. (1994) & 43 U.S.C. (1994)).
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Repealing the Preemption and the Timber Culture Acts, the Gen-
eral Revision Act empowered the President to "set apart and re-
serve ... any part of the public lands wholly or in part covered
with timber or undergrowth... as public reservations."'' 5 Along
with the reservation in 1872 of two million acres on the Upper
Yellowstone River in Wyoming Territory "as a public park or
pleasuring-ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people,"'0 6
the General Revision Act marked the beginning of a new policy of
federal retention and management of public lands from which cur-
rent federal land use policy has evolved.
Although it allowed forest lands to be set aside, the General
Revision Act did not provide any mechanism for the administra-
tion of the forest reserves.' ° Not until the passage of the Organic
Administration Act of 189708 did Congress delegate broad regula-
tory power to the Secretary of the Interior to "make such rules and
regulations and establish such service as will insure the objects of
such reservations, namely, to regulate their occupancy and use and
to preserve the forests thereon from destruction."'O' Administra-
tion of the forest reserves was first entrusted to the General Land
Office, which originated as a bureau of the Treasury Department
in 1812, ' but which became a part of the newly created Depart-
ment of the Interior in 1849."' In 1905 Congress transferred pri-
mary administrative responsibility for the forest reserves to the
Division of Forestry in the Department of Agriculture. 2 The Di-
vision of Forestry was subsequently renamed the Forest Service,"3
and in 1907 the forest reserves were designated national forests."
4
Thus, by the end of the first decade of this century the basic ad-
ministrative structure for the National Forest System was firmly
105. Id. at 1103.
106. Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, § 1, 17 Stat. 32, 32 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 21 (1994)).
107. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 91, at 18.
108. Organic Administration Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, 34 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482 (1994)).
109. 1& at 35.
110. Act of Apr. 25, 1812, ch. 68, § 1, 2 Stat. 716, 716 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 2 (1994)).
111. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 91, at 18. On the origins of the Gen-
eral Land Office, see Foss, supra note 35, at 13; GATES, supra note 29, at 127-28.
112. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 91, at 18.
113. Id.
114. Act of Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1256, 1269 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 420
(1994)).
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established.
The primary emphasis of the Organic Administration Act of
1897 was "for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of wa-
ter flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use
and necessities of citizens of the United States.",15 The Secretary
of the Interior was thereby authorized,
[f]or the purpose of preserving the living and growing
timber and promoting the younger growth on forest res-
ervations,... under such rules and regulations as he shall
prescribe, [to] cause to be designated and appraised so
much of the dead, matured, or large growth of trees found
upon such forest reservations as may be compatible with
the utilization of the forests thereon, and may sell the
same for not less than the appraised value in such quanti-
ties to each purchaser as he shall prescribe." 6
The forest reserves were thus set aside to be utilized for the man-
aged exploitation of their timber resources in such a way as not to
deplete those resources or to cause damage to watersheds. This
position found its most effective advocate in the person of Gifford
Pinchot, the first head of the National Forest Service.1 7 It was
Pinchot who first articulated the concept of the wise use of forest
resources."8 "All the resources of forest reserves are for use, and
this use must be brought about in a thoroughly prompt and busi-
nesslike manner, under such restrictions only as will insure the
permanence of these resources."" 9
In addition to managing timber sales, Pinchot sought to regu-
late grazing on the national forest lands.' Whereas timber har-
vesting in the forest reserves was well within the limits prescribed
for sustained use due to the continued availability of timber re-
sources on private lands and the difficulty of access to remote fed-
eral timberlands, public rangelands were already experiencing se-
vere overgrazing. Utilizing his authority under the Organic
Administration Act "to regulate [the] occupancy and use and to
preserve the forests.., from destruction... ,"'2 Pinchot restricted
115. Organic Administration Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. at 35.
116. Id.
117. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 91, at 18.
118. Id. at 22.
119. Id. at 54 n.269 (quoting Gifford Pinchot).
120. Id. at 55.
121. Id. at 21.
122. Organic Administration Act of 1897, ch. 2,30 Stat. at 35.
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grazing in the national forests and instituted the sale of grazing
permits.' 3
Thus, planning for timber and range began for different
reasons and reflected different priorities. Timber plan-
ning sought, first, to facilitate use (i.e., cutting) of the
trees and, second, to ensure reforestation after cutting.
Range planning sought, first, to protect the range re-
source from overuse and, second, to facilitate use (i.e.,
grazing) of the forage. Then, as now, emphasis was
placed on the water resource; a paramount objective of
both timber and grazing planning was to protect water-
sheds by preserving the forest cover and preventing soil
erosion and compaction.'24
During the 1920s the utilitarian philosophy of Pinchot began
to give way to the preservationist spirit championed by such fig-
ures as John Muir and Aldo Leopold, who advocated the protec-
tion of natural resource reserves for their own sake rather than for
economic use.'2' The Forest Service accordingly began to include
wilderness and recreational planning within its administrative
guidelines. Prior to World War II there was little conflict be-
tween the management of range, timber, and water resources on
the one hand and the various noncommodity uses on the other. 27
During the 1950s, however, a number of factors, including the
postwar building boom and a dramatic increase in the annual
number of recreational visits to the national forests, placed in-
creasing pressure on the Forest Service to alter its management
policies. "Lumber interests sought further increases in the allow-
able rate of timber cutting while preservation interests urged legis-
lation to prohibit the agency from harvesting or developing the
remaining wilderness in the national forests."' '
Congress responded by enacting the Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield (MUSY) Act of 1960,129 which gave legislative sanction to
the existing administrative guidelines promoting multiple use and
sustained yield of the national forest resources. The MUSY Act
123. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 91, at 55.
124. Id. at 22.
125. Id. at 335-36.
126. Id. at 26.
127. Id. at 28.
128. Id. at 29.
129. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994).
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provided that "[i]t is the policy of the Congress that the national
forests . . shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range,
timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.'. 3  Moreover,
"[t]he establishment and maintenance of areas of wilderness are
consistent with the purposes and provisions of [this Act].' 3 . The
Act defined multiple use to include the
harmonious and coordinated management of the various
resources, each with the other, without impairment of the
productivity of the land, with consideration being given to
the relative values of the various resources, and not nec-
essarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest
dollar return or the greatest unit output.' 
'2
At the same time that the Forest Service was developing plans
for the conservation and preservation of timber and grazing re-
sources in the national forests, concern was growing over the de-
terioration of other portions of the public lands due to overgraz-
ing. This concern led to the enactment of the Taylor Grazing
Act'33 in 1934, which authorized the Secretary of the Interior, "in
order to promote the highest use of the public lands pending its
[sic] final disposal,"'4 to withdraw "from all forms of entry of set-
tlement"'35 up to eighty million acres of "vacant, unappropriated,
and unreserved lands from any part of the public domain of the
United States.' ' 36 By means of language similar to that contained
in the Organic Administration Act, the Taylor Grazing Act organ-
ized these lands into grazing districts for which the Secretary was
directed to "make provision for the protection, administration,
regulation, and improvement" and to
make such rules and regulations and establish such serv-
ice, enter into such cooperative agreements, and do any
and all things necessary to accomplish the purposes of this
[Act] and to insure the objects of such grazing districts,
namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, to preserve
the land and its resources from destruction or unnecessary
injury, [and] to provide for the orderly use, improvement,
130. Id. § 528.
131. ld. § 529.
132. d§ 531.
133. Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1994).
134. Id. § 315.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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and development of the range.' 37
In addition, the Act authorizes the Secretary to issue permits "to
graze livestock on such grazing districts.., upon the payment an-
nually of reasonable fees in each case to be fixed or determined
from time to time.""13 The Act further provides that fifty percent
of all revenues derived from grazing fees shall be distributed "to
the State in which the lands producing such moneys are located, to
be expended as the State legislature may prescribe for the benefit
of the county or counties in which the lands producing such mon-
eys are located.' 3 1 The Act did nothing to disturb the exercise of
the rights of homesteaders on those lands not reserved for grazing
districts.'4 As to the grazing districts themselves, however, "the
creation of a grazing district or the issuance of a permit pursuant
to the provisions of this [Act] shall not create any right, title, inter-
est, or estate in or to the lands.'
141
An additional step toward the withdrawal of certain portions
of the public lands from unrestricted exploitation was taken by the
Wilderness Act of 1964,42 the avowed purpose of which was "to
secure for the American people of present and future generations
the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness.', 143 The Secre-
taries of Interior and Agriculture were directed to inventory all
roadless areas within their respective administrative authority and
to recommend those areas suitable for inclusion in the National
Wilderness Preservation System.144 Once included, the Act prohib-
ited any commercial enterprise or permanent road "within any
wilderness area.., and,... there shall be no temporary road, no
use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, no
landing of aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport, and no
structure or installation within any such area."' 4
Modern federal land-use policy crystallized with the passage
of the National Forest Management Act'4 (NFMA) and the Fed-
137. ld § 315a.
138. Id. § 315b.
139. Id. § 315i.
140. Id. § 315f.
141. Id. § 315b.
142. 16 U.S.C. § 1131-1136 (1994).
143. Id. § 1131.
144. Id. § 1132(b)-(c).
145. Id § 1133(c).
146. 16 U.S.C. 88 1600-1614 (1994) and other scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.
(1994).
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eral Land Policy and Management Act1 47 (FLPMA), both of which
became law on the same day in 1976, and both of which represent
current statutory authority for federal land-use policy by the Na-
tional Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management, re-
spectively. The NFMA essentially reinforces the provisions of the
MUSY Act but mandates more extensive planning procedures for
the Forest Service to follow in allocating available timber re-
sources. 4" The FLPMA repealed the various homestead acts,
thereby retaining in federal ownership all remaining unclaimed
public lands.1 49 It also mandated planning procedures to be fol-
lowed by the BLM in allocating grazing allotments.50
The other major environmental statutes that affect the public
lands are the National Environmental Policy Act of 19691"
(NEPA), which requires all agencies of the federal government to
perform an environmental impact statement (EIS) for all "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment,"' 2 and the Endangered Species Act of 1973,153 which
requires each federal agency to "insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency.., is not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habi-
tat of such species....",4
III. THE PROPERTY RIGHTS ARGUMENT
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the fed-
eral government from taking private property without payment of
just compensation. 5 5 Such a taking can occur in one of two ways.
It can result from the physical occupation of private property by
147. 43 U.S.C. § 1701-1784 (1994).
148. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 91, at 69.
149. 43 U.S.C. §§ 221-224 (1994).
150. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 91, at 108-09.
151. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
152 Id. § 4332.
153. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
154. IMt § 1536(a)(2).
155. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation."). The takings language of the Fifth Amendment has
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to apply to the states as well. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978) (stating that "of course [the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment] is made applicable to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment.").
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the government,' s6 or it can result when governmental regulation
of private property "goes too far." ' s' In analyzing any alleged
regulatory taking, courts are guided by two basic criteria. The first
is whether the government has advanced a legitimate state interest
by means of its regulation, and the second is the extent to which
the governmental regulation has restricted the economically viable
use of the property.
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has allowed a great deal of
latitude in government regulation of private property. '59 In recent
years, however, the Court has begun redefining its approach to
regulatory takings,'6 applying a somewhat more rigorous analysis
156. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
[W]here governmental action results in "[a] permanent physical occupa-
tion" of the property, by the government itself or by others .... "our cases
uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without re-
gard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only
minimal economic impact on the owner."
Id. at 831-32 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419,432-33 n.9, 434-35 (1982)).
157. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922) ("The general rule
at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking.").
158. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) ("As we
have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use
regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an
owner economically viable use of his land."' (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255,260 (1980))).
159. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Re-examination of the Takings Ju-
risprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1892, 1932 (1992) (concluding that all but one of the
modern Court's cases finding a compensable taking have been grounded on the
physical occupation of the complainant's property).
160. In Nollan the Court ruled that a taking had occurred, despite the absence of
any adverse economic impact on the owner, because the condition imposed as part of
a permit requirement was not sufficiently related to the government's alleged regula-
tory interest. 483 U.S. at 837. Similarly, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309
(1994), the Court went further to determine not only "whether the 'essential nexus'
exists between the 'legitimate state interest' and the permit condition exacted by the
city," IL at 2317 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837), but also whether there was a
"rough proportionality" according to which "the city must make some sort of indi-
vidualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development." Id. at 2319-20.
In Lucas the Court found a taking on alternate grounds where state regula-
tion had denied "all economically beneficial or productive use of land." 505 U.S. at
1015. The extent to which property owners have been deprived of the economically
viable use of their property depends to a large degree upon "'[tihe economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant and ... the extent to which the regulation has inter-
fered with distinct investment-backed expectations."' Id. at 1019 n.8 (quoting Penn
Cent., 438 U.S. at 124). The only exceptions to this principle that the Court identifies
are "restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nui-
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of government regulation that adherents to the Wise-Use move-
ment have sought to interpret in such a way as to protect various
types of private interests in the public lands from government in-
trusion.
One obvious problem with applying a takings analysis in the
context of public land regulation is that a private property right
must first exist before it can be taken. Accordingly, those seeking
compensation for government interference with private property
rights in the public lands must first establish that they do indeed
hold such rights. Only then can they claim that federal regulation
of the public lands has so far divested them of those rights as to re-
sult in a taking of their private property. The determination of
such a claim must then, in turn, be resolved on the basis of the cri-
teria articulated by the Court as to what kind of government action
constitutes a compensable taking.
Wise-Use advocates have employed a number of legal argu-
ments to support their claims to a property interest in the public
lands.61 The majority of these claims relate to the right to graze
livestock on western public rangelands and vary in complexity
from the sophisticated to the absurd. One such argument contends
that, in spite of statutory language to the contrary, 162 the granting
of a grazing lease or permit1 63 on the public lands results in a vested
property right in the permit itself. The federal courts, however,
have repeatedly rejected the contention that grazing permits are
anything other than mere privileges subject to revocation or modi-
fication without compensation at any time.'4 In McKinley v.
sance already place upon land ownership." Id. at 1029.
161. See Miller, supra note 18, at 845; Lavelle, supra note 1, at A22.
162. "[I]ssuance of a permit pursuant to the provisions of this [Act] shall not cre-
ate any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands." 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1994);
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed as modifying in any way ... with respect to
the creation of right, title, interest or estate in or to... lands in National Forests by
issuance of grazing permits." 43 U.S.C. § 1752(h) (1994).
163. Although there are technical differences between a grazing lease and a graz-
ing permit, for the purposes of this Comment, the two terms will be used inter-
changeably. See 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1995).
164. "The provisions of the Taylor Grazing Act... make clear the congressional
intent that no compensable property right be created in the permit lands themselves
as a result of the issuance of the permit." United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494
(1973); see also Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that permits
may be modified or cancelled in order to implement grazing rights); Pankey Land &
Cattle Co. v. Hardin, 427 F.2d 43 (10th Cir. 1970) (holding that livestock permits are
not constitutionally protected against taking); United States v. Jaramillo, 190 F.2d
300 (10th Cir. 1951) (recognizing that permits can be withdrawn or cancelled at any
time); United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1951) (recognizing a preferential
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United States16 the district court denied that a reduction by the
USFS of the plaintiff's grazing allotment in the Cibola National
Forest in New Mexico constituted a compensable taking. Recog-
nizing that grazing permits are clearly valuable to ranchers, the
court nevertheless determined that "'they are not an interest pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment against taking by the government
who granted them with the understanding that they could be with-
drawn .. without payment of compensation. ' ' '166 Moreover,
"[ilt is safe to say that it has always been the intention and
policy of the government to regard the use of its public
lands for stock grazing, either under the original tacit con-
sent or, as to national forests, under regulation through
the permit system, as a privilege which is withdrawable at
any time for any use by the sovereign without the pay-
ment of compensation."
More recently, in Hage v. United States16 the plaintiffs alleged
on various grounds that a number of actions by the USFS to inter-
fere with their grazing allotment on national forest lands consti-
tuted a taking of their property. Ruling on the government's mo-
tion for summary judgement, the United States Claims Court
denied the plaintiffs' claim to a property interest in their grazing
permit, concluding that "as a matter of law plaintiffs do not have a
right to graze, but regarding the right as subject to withdrawal); Osborne v. United
States, 145 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1944) (upholding appropriation of grazing land under
permit for military purposes).
165. 828 F. Supp. 888 (D. N.M. 1993).
166. Id. at 893 (quoting Pankey Land & Cattle Co., 427 F.2d at 44).
167. Id. (quoting Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d at 719).
168. 35 Fed. Cl. 147 (1996). Plaintiffs E. Wayne Hage and Jean N. Hage are
ranchers who live near Tonopah, Nevada. In addition to filing a takings claim
against the federal government, Wayne Hage has authored a book outlining many of
the philosophical justifications upon which his lawsuit is predicated. WAYNE HAGE,
STORM OVER RANGELANDS: PRIVATE RIGHTS IN FEDERAL LANDS (1989). Hage also
removed trees in the Toiyabe National Forest, allegedly to insure water flow in an
irrigation ditch that carries water to which he claims to have a private property inter-
est. Although he was found guilty in federal court of injury to federal property,
Anita P. Miller, All Is Not Quiet on the Western Front, 25 URB. LAw. 827, 837 (1993),
Hage's conviction was overturned by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. United
States v. Seaman, 18 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 1994). Hage's book, Storm Over Rangelands,
is published as a project of the National Federal Lands Conference, a Wise-Use
group, with an introduction by Ron Arnold, Executive Vice President of the Center
for the Defense of Free Enterprise, see supra note 9 and accompanying text. For a
thorough discussion of Hage's property rights argument in the context of current
takings jurisprudence, see Theodore Blank, Comment, Grazing Rights on Public
Lands: Wayne Hage Complains of a Taking, 30 IDAHO L. REv. 603 (1994).
November 1996]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
property interest in the permit or the rangeland themselves." 6 9
The court further determined that "Congress had no legislative in-
tention of creating a property interest in the permit just as Con-
gress had no legislative intention of creating a property interest in
the underlying federal lands."'70 Nor did the "Supreme Court...
determine that private parties had a property interest in the fed-
eral lands. Rather, the Supreme Court held that one who makes
beneficial use of the public lands has a greater priority to the use
of... that land than another private party who did not. 17'  Ad-
dressing plaintiffs' further claims, the court characterized a grazing
permit as a revocable license, "the cancellation of which does not
give rise to damages. 172 However, the court agreed to hear evi-
dence concerning plaintiffs' claims to compensation for the im-
poundment and sale of plaintiffs' cattle that continued to graze on
the suspended allotment,7 for the construction by plaintiffs of
permanent improvements on the suspended allotment,174 and for
plaintiffs' property rights in water, ditch rights-of-way, and forage
on the suspended allotments.7 5
The claim to compensation for water, ditch rights-of-way, and
forage on public lands represents a somewhat more sophisticated
variation on the property rights argument. This argument relies on
the so-called split-estate theory76 according to which the federal
government holds title to the public lands, but various types of pri-
vate interests, such as mining claims, water rights, and grazing
rights, have been severed from the public domain and have been
acquired by private property owners. This argument maintains
that the acquiescence of the federal government in the prior ap-
propriation of western public lands and resources has conferred a
property interest on those who occupied and made beneficial use
of those resources.lV Because different facets of federal public
land-use policy developed separately, the validity of this argument
depends upon the nature of the resource in question; however, cer-
169. Hage, 35 Fed. CI. at 170.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 460-61 (1922) vacated, 353
U.S. 953 (1957)).
172. Id at 150.
173. Id. at 177.
174. Id. at 179.
175. Id. at 171.
176. HAGE, supra note 168, at 3-5, 87-92.
177. Id at 9-13, 135-39.
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tain general principles apply to the disposition of all public lands.
Under the Property Clause of the Constitution, "[t]he Con-
gress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to
the United States."' 7 In practice, the courts have interpreted this
to mean that a private right in the public lands may vest only
through an affirmative act of the federal government."' As a re-
sult, the government cannot forfeit title to the public lands by
means of adverse possession. or by prescription.'- In order to as-
sert a private property interest in the public lands, one must there-
fore establish that Congress has expressly conferred such a right.
Even when a private property right in the public lands can be
shown, it does not necessarily follow that any government interfer-
ence with that right automatically results in a taking. Accordingly,
the following discussion will first examine the substance of various
arguments advanced by Wise-Use advocates in support of private
property rights in the public lands. It will then argue that even if
these arguments can succeed, the property rights asserted do not
warrant protection under the Fifth Amendment from interference
by the federal government without payment of just compensation.
A. Grazing Rights
Having been thwarted in their attempts to assert a property
right-in the possession of a permit to graze livestock on the public
lands, those who wish to establish a private property interest in
grazing rights on the public lands now argue that federal acquies-
cence in the prior occupation and use of the public lands for live-
stock grazing has conferred an equitable estate in the use of those
178. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
179. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 536 (1976) ("[D]eterminations
under the Property Clause are entrusted primarily to the judgement of Congress.").
180. E.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
The Government, which holds its interests here as elsewhere in trust for all
the people, is not to be deprived of those interests by the ordinary court
rules... and officers ... cannot by their conduct cause the Government to
lose its valuable rights by their acquiescence, laches, or failure to act.
Id- at 40; United States v. Wilson, 523 F. Supp. 874, 898 (N.D. Iowa 1981) ("It is well
settled that title by adverse possession, laches, or statutes of limitation cannot be as-
serted against the United States .... "), rev'd on other grounds, 707 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1982).
181. E.g., United States v. Osterlund, 505 F. Supp. 165, 168 (D. Colo. 1981) ("[N]o
right by prescription may be obtained against the government."), affld, 671 F.2d 1267
(10th Cir. 1982).
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lands for which the grant of a grazing permit merely serves as an
acknowledgement.8  This argument thus maintains that the prop-
erty right is not in the permit itself, but in the grazing preference
that recognizes the permittee's pre-existing right to graze livestock
on the public range, thereby bestowing on the owner exclusive
right to the permit."'
The BLM regulations define a grazing preference as "the total
number of animal unit months of livestock grazing on public lands
apportioned and attached to base property owned or controlled by
a permittee or lessee. '' 84 A grazing preference is thus the amount
of forage, calculated in terms of animal unit months,85 that a per-
mittee is entitled to claim on the public lands during the grazing
season. Moreover, a grazing preference is attached to base prop-
erty, "'86 which consists of the following:
(1) Land that has the capability to produce crops or for-
age that can be used to support authorized livestock for a
specified period of the year, or (2) water that is suitable
for consumption by livestock and is available and acces-
sible, to the authorized livestock when the public lands
are used for livestock grazing." 7
To qualify for a grazing preference, an applicant must there-
fore own or control livestock and base property. 8 In addition, the
argument maintains that because grazing preferences were
awarded primarily to those who were already engaged in livestock
grazing on the lands to which the grazing preference applied at the
time that the public lands were withdrawn from settlement, a
grazing preference cannot be created by the BLM or the Forest
Service, but can be acquired only through transfer from one base
property to another, or from transfer of the base property itself
from one owner to another. 89 According to this reasoning, then,
"the preference on federal lands is not created by the federal gov-
182. Frank J. Falen & Karen Budd-Falen, The Right to Graze Livestock on the
Federal Lands: The Historical Development of Western Grazing Rights, 30 IDAHo L.
REv. 505,506 (1994).
183. Id. at 509 n.27; HAGE, supra note 168, at 187.
184. 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1995).
185. An animal unit month is defined as "the amount of forage necessary for the
sustenance of one cow or its equivalent for a period of 1 month." Id.
186. Id. § 4110.2-2(b).
187. Id. § 4100.0-5.
188. Id. § 4110.1.
189. Falen & Budd-Falen, supra note 182, at 507-08 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 4110.2-3
(1995) & 36 C.F.R. § 222.3 (1995)).
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ernment, but rather was acquired by the permittee because of,
among other things, prior use of the federal lands."'' Given these
characteristics, adherents to this argument maintain that, with re-
spect to grazing rights, the conclusion is inescapable that "a private
property right of some sort in the federal lands is obviously in-
volved."' '
Proponents of the argument further seek to bolster their posi-
tion by means of case law, citing in particular two specific cases,
both of which are capable of alternate interpretations. In Shuffle-
barger v. CommissionerW 9' the United States Tax Court held that a
grazing preference constitutes, at least for tax purposes, an indefi-
nitely continuing right that cannot be amortized over time.1 93
Wise-Use advocates maintain that this case stands for the proposi-
tion that a grazing preference amounts to a property 
right.194
However, the court also stated that grazing preferences "in and of
themselves do not convey or grant the legal right to the use of the
range, but they do supply the means whereby the apportionment
of the range among the members of the livestock industry making
use thereof is effectuated."'95 It is a strange form of property right
that does not grant the legal use for which it purportedly serves as
the foundation. Instead, the court determined that a grazing pref-
erence does nothing more than "entitle 'the holder to special con-
sideration over other applicants who have not established prefer-
ences.'"l
The court in Hage v. United States'97 dealt similarly with the is-
sue, characterizing a grazing preference as merely a "right of first
refusal."' 98 "In fact, all precedent indicates that the privilege to
graze never created a property interest but rather a preference to
use the allotment before the government gave the right to an-
other."'1' Thus, the courts have so far maintained that a grazing
preference confers no property right in the public rangeland, nor
does it constitute a property interest in itself.
190. d at 508.
191. HAGE, supra note 168, at 4.
192. 24 T.C. 980 (1955).
193. Id. at 994.
194. Falen & Budd-Falen, supra note 182, at 511.
195. Shufflebarger, 24 T.C. at 992.
196. Id. at 981 n.1 (quoting Forest Service Manual).
197. Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147 (1996).
198. Id. at 170.
199. d
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More significant in the development of federal policy regard-
ing grazing rights on the public lands is Buford v. Houtz, o which
Wise-Use advocates cite for the proposition that
there is an implied license, growing out of the custom of
nearly a hundred years, that the public lands of the
United States... shall be free to the people who seek to
use them where they are left open and unenclosed, and no
act of government forbids this use.... The government of
the United States, in all its branches, has known of this
use, has never forbidden it, nor taken any steps to arrest
it. No doubt it may be safely stated that this has been
done with the consent of all branches of the government,
and, as we shall attempt to show, with its direct encour-
agement. °1
While the implied license language in Buford seems to sup-
port the assertion of a grazing right on the public lands, the facts in
the case serve to undermine that position. The plaintiff, who
owned sections of rangeland in Utah that were interspersed among
sections of public land on which he grazed cattle, sought an in-
junction to prevent the defendant from grazing sheep on the public
lands over which the plaintiff sought exclusive control 2 By deny-
ing the injunction, the Court established that the plaintiff could not
assert a preferential right to the public lands. Instead, the Court
ruled that the public lands were to remain open to all equally, at
least as long as "no act of government forbids this use."2 3
Congress had in fact acted for the purpose of maintaining
equal and open access to the public lands by means of the Unlaw-
ful Inclosures Act of 1885,0 which made it illegal to enclose the
public lands or hinder another in their use. Moreover, under the
statute "the assertion of a right to the exclusive use and occupancy
of any part of the public lands of the United States ... without
claim, color of title, or asserted right.., is likewise declared un-
lawful, and prohibited." 2 s In interpreting this statute, the Supreme
Court went so far as to prohibit the fencing of private land where
200. 133 U.S. 320 (1890).
201. Id. at 326. See HAGE, supra note 168, at 15-16, 72-74, 115 (citing Buford v.
Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890)).
202. Buford, 133 U.S. at 321-24.
203. Id. at 326.
204. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1066 (1994).
205. Id. § 1061.
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the effect of such action was to enclose public land.2°6 The Court
was firm in its judgement that "[i]f there be any general impression
that in dealing with public lands the rights are altogether those of
the individual proprietors, and that such rights as the Government
has exist only by their sufferance, the [Unlawful Inclosures Act]
will do much to rectify this misapprehension." 2° Furthermore,
[i]f practices of this kind were tolerated, it would be but a
step further to claim that the defendants, by long acquies-
cence of the Government in their appropriation of public
lands, had acquired a title to them as against every one
except the Government, and perhaps even against the
Government itself.2
It would be difficult to conceive of a more forthright expres-
sion of the Court's determination that no private preferential
grazing right exists in the public lands. However, the Court ad-
dressed the issue yet again in adjudicating the rights of a Colorado
rancher who challenged the government's authority to withdraw
public rangeland under the General Revision Act of 1891.209 In
Light v. United States2 ' the Court reiterated its position that the
government's "failure to object.., did not confer any vested right
on the complainant, nor did it deprive the United States of the
power of recalling any implied license under which the land had
been used for private purposes., 21' In addition, "[t]he United
States can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its prop-
erty may be used. As it can withhold or reserve the land it can do
so indefinitely.,
212
The case law thus clearly establishes that the government's
acquiescence in the grazing of livestock on the public lands con-
ferred no proprietary right to the continued use of the public do-
main by ranchers and stockmen. Although it was within the power
of Congress to create property rights in those who had established
a prior use of the public lands for grazing purposes, Congress
never did so. Absent such an express provision by Congress, no
206. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
207. Id. at 526.
208. Id. at 527.
209. General Revision Act, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095 (1891) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. (1994), 30 U.S.C. (1994) & 43 U.S.C. (1994)). See su-
pra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
210. 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
211. Id. at 535.
212. Id. at 536.
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property right in a grazing preference can exist. For obvious rea-
sons, therefore, any argument claiming that government interfer-
ence with such a nonexistent right constitutes a taking must inevi-
tably fail.
B. Water Rights
The situation is somewhat more complex in regard to the
ownership of water rights on the public lands. In the absence of a
clear federal policy for the disposition of water rights in the public
domain, early settlers who sought to divert water from the public
lands for the purpose of mining or grazing livestock developed, on
the basis of custom and use, a system of acquisition by means of
prior appropriation.213 When Congress finally addressed itself to
the issue of water rights, it tended to bow to necessity and recog-
nize the system that had already grown into place. The Mining
Act of 1866214 largely validated pre-existing claims to water on the
public lands, stating,
whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of
water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other
purposes, have vested and accrued, and the same are rec-
ognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and
the decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such
vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the
215same.
The Placer Mining Act of 1870216 incorporated provisions of
the preceding Act and further provided that "all patents granted,
or preemption or homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any
vested and accrued water rights, or rights to ditches and reservoirs
used in connection with such water rights, as may have been ac-
quired under or recognized by the [Mining Act of 1866]. ' '27 Fi-
nally, in the Desert Land Act of 1877218 Congress predicated "the
213. See Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457-58 (1878) (discussing the development
of the prior appropriations doctrine in the context of mining claims and water rights).
214. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.
§§ 43-46,51 (1994) & 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1994)).
215. Id. at 253.
216. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§
35-38,52 (1994) & 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1994)).
217. Id. at 218.
218. Desert Land Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. 88 321-339 (1994)).
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right to the use of water ... upon bona fide prior appropriation., 21
9
Moreover, "the water of all, lakes, rivers and other sources of wa-
ter supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain
and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for ir-
rigation, mining and manufacturing purposes subject to existing
rights."' 0
Attempting to unravel the language of these statutes in the
context of actual claims to water on the public lands, the Supreme
Court eventually arrived at a formulation that recognized the prior
appropriation of water rights on the public lands in conformity
with state law as long as state law did not seek to extend beyond
the specific authority granted by Congress and interfere with the
rights of the United States in water on public lands.22' According
to the Court, the effect of these statutes was thus to sever the wa-
ter rights from the public lands.m It would appear, therefore, that
the split-estate theory does indeed apply to water rights that have
been acquired on the public lands by means of prior appropriation
in accordance with state law.
Wise-Use advocates have seized on the willingness of Con-
gress and the courts to recognize the acquisition of vested water
rights on the public lands in order to assert two separate but
closely related arguments. The first argument maintains that inso-
far as water rights on the public lands were granted primarily on
the basis that the grazing of livestock on the adjoining rangeland
constituted the beneficial use that made possible the acquisition of
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690
(1899). The Court recognized the power of a state to regulate water rights within its
dominion, subject to the limitation that "in the absence of specific authority from
Congress a State cannot by its legislation destroy the right of the United States, as
the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters." Id. at
703. Nevertheless, "[t]he effect of [the Mining Act of 1866] was to recognize, so far
as the United States are concerned, the validity of the local customs, laws and deci-
sions of courts in respect to the appropriation of water." Id. at 704; see also Califor-
nia Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
If it be conceded that in the absence of federal legislation the state would
be powerless to affect the riparian rights of the United States or its grant-
ees, still, the authority of Congress to vest such power in the state, and that
it has done so by the [Desert Land Act of 1877], cannot be doubted.
Id. at 162.
222. California Or. Power Co., 295 U.S. at 158 ("If this language [of the Desert
Land Act of 1877] is to be given its natural meaning, and we see no reason why it
should not, it effected a severance of all waters upon the public domain, not thereto-
fore appropriated, from the land itself.").
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the water fights in the first place, the acquisition of the water fights
thereby validated the right to graze livestock on the adjoining land.
In other words, the water rights, once severed from the public do-
main and acquired by means of prior appropriation, became the
basis for asserting a property interest in the land that facilitated
the acquisition of the water fights to begin with.m
This rather convoluted argument has been litigated in the fed-
eral courts where it received little sympathy. In Hunter v. United
States224 the appellant claimed water rights on public lands for
which cattle grazing served as the beneficial use.211 When the
United States sought to enjoin Hunter from grazing cattle on lands
recently annexed to Death Valley National Monument, he claimed
that cattle grazing was an appurtenant right to his vested water
right.2'6 The court agreed that under the Mining Acts of 1866 and
1870, Hunter did indeed possess a valid water right;W however, the
court held that neither common law nor statutory enactment cre-
ated any right to graze cattle on the adjoining public rangeland.?2
Likening Hunter's argument to a claim that vested water rights for
the use of irrigation would grant rights to the land upon which the
water is to be used, the court rejected the notion that a property
right necessarily "include[s] the thing with which the right granted
is used." 9
Hunter's further argument that Congress must have intended
to include grazing in the statutory grant of water rights was like-
wise rejected by the court because the Act in question specifically
granted rights only for "the construction of ditches and canals."
Moreover, any such construction of the statute would tend to re-
strict the free use of the public lands in a manner inconsistent with
stated policy goals.31 Thus, regardless of how one seeks to get
around it, the principle remains that no private property right can
accrue on the public lands absent the unambiguous expression of
Congress to create such a right. Again, where no private property
right exists, there can be no taking by the government.
223. See, e.g., HAGE, supra note 168, at 115, 141-44; Blank, supra note 168, at 610.
224. 388 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1967).
225. Id at 151.
226. Id. at 150-51.
227. Id. at 151-53.
228. Id. at 154.
229. Id.
230. Id (quoting Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. at 253).
231. Id.
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The second and somewhat more straightforward argument
that arises from the recognition of vested water rights on the pub-
lic lands maintains that any reduction in grazing allotments by fed-
eral agencies results in a corresponding reduction in the value of
the vested water rights and therefore constitutes a taking. This is-
sue was broached but not resolved in Nevada Land Action Ass'n v.
United States Forest Service,'2 2 in which the Ninth Circuit ruled that
under the provisions of the NFMA the plaintiff could not preclude
action by the USFS to decrease grazing levels in the Toiyabe Na-
tional Forest, but could file suit to obtain compensation if a taking
of vested water rights had occurred. Since the plaintiff had not
filed such an action, the court did not rule on its merits. 3'
The argument has since been taken up in Hage v. United
States,234 where the plaintiffs claim that suspension of their grazing
permit by the USFS deprived them of their vested water rights in
the Toiyabe National Forest.25 Recognizing that the Mining Act
of 1866 "clearly acknowledges vested water rights on public
lands,"'26 the court agreed to hear evidence concerning plaintiffs'
"ownershi of water rights and the scope of that property right in
Nevada." Depending upon the resolution of the factual issue re-
garding plaintiffs' water rights, the court will allow the plaintiffs'
taking claim to proceed.2'
Under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,39 in order for
a taking to occur, the government must deprive a property owner
of "all economically beneficial or productive use" of the property
in question.24 It is unlikely that a mere reduction in grazing allot-
ments is sufficient to reduce the value of vested property rights to
such a degree; however, allowing that such a situation may occur,
the extent to which property owners have been deprived of the
economically viable use of their property depends upon "the ex-
tent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations." 241 Moreover, the test is whether such
232. 8 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1993).
233. Id. at 719.
234. Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. C1. 147 (1996).
235. Id. at 156.
236. Id. at 172.
237. Id. at 173.
238. Id. at 180.
239. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
240. Id. at 1015.
241. Id. at 1019 n.8 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
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investment-backed expectations are reasonable. 242 According to
the Court's decision in Lucas, a property owner's expectations are
not reasonable where "the proscribed use interests were not part
of his title to begin with."-'' This language clearly defeats any
claim to grazing rights on the federal lands where valid title never
passed into the hands of private property owners; in addition,
however, similar language has been used by the Court to defeat
claims to compensation for interference by the government with
vested property rights on the public lands.
Even where recognized possessory interests have been di-
vested through government regulation of the public lands, courts
have not hesitated to rule that such regulation did not amount to a
compensable taking. In United States v. Locke,2 4 appellees were
holders of unpatented mining claims on public lands near Ely, Ne-
vada who failed to file their annual notice of intent to hold their
claims by the December 30 deadline as required under section
314(a) of the FLPMA.2 45 In accordance with section 314(c), appel-
lees were subsequently notified by the BLM that their claims hadlee  ere bs nt 246BM
been declared abandoned. In reversing the lower court's finding
in favor of appellees, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
"owners of unpatented mining claims hold fully recognized posses-
sory interests in their claims."247 However, such interests are a
"'unique form of property"' 248 because "[t]he United States, as
owner of the underlying fee title to the public domain, maintains
broad powers over the terms and conditions upon which the public
lands can be used, leased, and acquired." 249 Because in this case
the burden of compliance was slight and the statute and its pur-
pose were reasonable, the Court held that "[r]egulation of prop-
erty rights does not 'take' private property when an individual's
reasonable, investment-backed expectations can continue to be
realized as long as he complies with reasonable regulatory restric-
104, 124 (1978)).
242. Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Where a taking is alleged from regu-
lations which deprive the property of all value, the test must be whether the depri-
vation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expectations.").
243. Id. at 1027.
244. 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
245. Id. at 89-90.
246. Id. at 90.
247. Id. at 104.
248. Id. (quoting Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334,335 (1963)).
249. Id.
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tions the legislature has imposed."' ' It appears, therefore, that be-
cause private interests in the public lands are acquired subject to
the federal government's paramount title to the public domain,
even possessory interests can be divested by government regula-
tion as long as such regulation is reasonable.
Mining claims became subject to private ownership by means
of statutory enactment in much the same way that water rights
did.2's It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that water rights are
subject to the same expectations to which mining claims are sub-
ject. Water rights can thus be made subject to reasonable govern-
ment regulation without such regulation constituting a taking for
which compensation is required. Whatever valid arguments that
the Wise-Use movement may adduce in favor of its claims to the
continued unrestricted exploitation of our nation's public resour-
ces, the argument that regulation of the public lands by the federal
government constitutes a taking for which just compensation must
be paid is not one of them.
IV. THE COUNTY SUPREMACY ARGUMENT
The County Supremacy movement finds expression in the en-
actment in recent years of a number of ordinances by various
counties throughout the western states designed to establish local
control over public lands within their boundaries.z2 These ordi-
nances typically follow one of two patterns 23 The first approach
relies for its justification upon the protection of local custom and
culture, which it defines almost exclusively as grazing and resource
extraction.2 The second, and more radical, approach argues on
the basis of the equal footing doctrine 5 that, upon statehood, the
various state governments assumed control over all public lands
250. Id. at 107.
251. See Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 30 U.S.C. (1994)).
252. Lavelle, supra note 1, at A22; Miller, supra note 168, at 828.
253. Lavelle, supra note 1, at A22.
254. Id.; Miller, supra note 168, at 828, 833; see Scott W. Reed, The County Su-
premacy Movement: Mendacious Myth Marketing, 30 IDAHo L. REv. 525, 529 (1994);
see also Falen & Budd-Falen, supra note 182, at 511-22 (arguing that grazing rights in
the southwestern states derive from early Spanish usages that were recognized by the
United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo of 1848, which ended the Mexican
War).
255. The Northwest Ordinance provided for the admission of new states "to a
share in the Federal councils on an equal footing with the original states." Act of
Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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within each state to which the federal government could not assert
jurisdiction under Article I of the Constitution25 A close exami-
nation of each approach, however, reveals flaws in legal reasoning
that invalidate the resulting ordinances that seek to impose local
control over the public lands.
A. Custom and Culture
Modelled after the Interim Land Use Policy Plan of Catron
County, New Mexico,2 those ordinances that rely upon the pro-
tection of local custom and culture to assert local control over
public lands challenge federal authority primarily on statutory
grounds.28 Adapting language from NEPA29 stating that it is the
policy of the federal government to "preserve important historic,
cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and main-
tain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity
and variety of individual choice,"2' 6 the counties assert that Con-
gress has allowed for local interests to take precedence over fed-
eral management of the public lands.261
According to the Catron County ordinance, "all federal and
state agencies shall comply with the Catron County Land Use
Policy Plan and coordinate with the County Commission for the
purpose of planning and managing federal and state lands within
the geographic boundaries of Catron County, New Mexico.
2 62
Designating the County Commissioners as the lead planning
agency within the county,2 the ordinance further requires that
"[f]ederal and state agencies proposing actions ... shall prepare
and submit in writing,... report(s) on the purposes, objectives and
256. Lavelle, supra note 1, at A22. Article I of the Constitution grants Congress
exclusive authority over specific lands designated for "the seat of the government of
the United States" and "for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards,
and other needful buildings." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
257. Catron County, N.M., Ordinance 004-91 (May 21, 1991), repealed by Catron
County, N.M., Ordinance 003-92 (Oct. 6, 1992). The Catron County Interim Land
Use Policy Plan was subsequently published by the National Federal Lands Confer-
ence, a Wise-Use umbrella group in Bountiful, Utah that markets the plan to inter-
ested county governments at a cost of $250. Miller, supra note 168, at 828; see Reed,
supra note 254, at 529.
258. Lavelle, supra note 1, at A22.
259. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994).
260. Id. § 4331(b)(4).
261. Reed, supra note 254, at 549.
262. Catron County, N.M. Ordinance 004-91 (May 21, 1991).
263. Id.
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estimated impacts of such actions... to the Catron County Com-
mission.., for review and coordination prior to ... initiation of
action." 264 Moreover, county concurrence is required for all fed-
eral land adjustments in the county.26' Federal agencies may not
change any land uses prior to the preparation and approval by the
county of an adverse impact statement;26 federal agencies may not
acquire additional property within the county without ensuring
that parity in current public and private land ownership status is
maintained; 67 public lands that are difficult to manage or lie in
isolated tracts are to be targeted for disposal;268 no additional wil-
derness areas shall be designated in the county,269 and federally
proposed designations of wild and scenic rivers shall comply with
county water use plans.270
Despite the recent proliferation of County Supremacy ordi-
nances throughout the western states," 1 at least one such ordinance
has failed to survive challenge in state court. In Boundary Back-
packers v. Boundary County 272 the Idaho Supreme Court struck
down an ordinance substantially similar to that of Catron
County.273 Declaring that "portions of the ordinance are pre-
empted by federal law and are therefore unconstitutional," 274 the
court refused to sever the offending provisions and concluded that
"the entire ordinance is invalid."275
The doctrine of preemption upon which the court in Boundary
Backpackers relied is well established.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. For a comprehensive discussion of the widespread adoption of custom and
culture ordinances by counties throughout the western United States, see Andrea
Hungerford, Comment, "Custom and Culture" Ordinances: Not a Wise Move for the
Wise Use Movement, 8 TUL. ENVrL. L.J. 457,461-68 (1995).
272. 913 P.2d 1141 (Idaho 1996).
273. See id. at 1143-44 (quoting relevant portions of the Boundary County Interim
Land Use Policy Plan). In addition to provisions borrowed from the Catron County
ordinance, however, the Boundary County Interim Land Use Policy Plan requires
specific prior county approval for "any proposed changes in wildlife habitat, wildlife
recovery plans, timber sales volume projections, restricted access, road closures, and
primitive or wilderness designation." Boundary County, Idaho, Ordinance 92-2
(Aug. 3, 1992).
274. Boundary Backpackers, 913 P.2d at 1148.
275. Id.
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[S]tate law can be pre-empted in either of two general
ways. If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given
field, any state law falling within that field is pre-empted.
If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation
over the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted
to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is,
when it is impossible to comply with both state and fed-
eral law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.
In the context of public land law, congressional authority to
regulate the public lands derives from the Property Clause of the
Constitution, according to which, "[t]he Congress shall have power
to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or other property belonging to the United States."
217
Such rules and regulations take precedence over state and local
laws by operation of the Supremacy Clause, which states, "[tihis
Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme law of the
land;.., any thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the
contrary notwithstanding." 28 Construing the Property Clause, the
United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly observed that '[t]he
power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without
limitations."' 279 Hence,
[a]bsent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains
jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but
Congress equally surely retains the power to enact legis-
lation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property
Clause. And when Congress so acts, the federal legisla-
tion necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the
Supremacy Clause.20
Thus, where state or local law conflicts with federal legislation
"passed pursuant to the Property Clause, the law is clear: The
state laws must recede."2'
276. Id at 1146 (quoting California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480
U.S. 572, 581 (1987)).
277. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
278. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
279. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) (quoting United States v.
San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16,29 (1940)).
280. Id at 543 (citations omitted).
281. Id.
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What is not so clear, perhaps, is what happens when state laws
regulating federal land do not directly conflict with federal legisla-
tion. In this regard the Court has recognized that "[t]he Property
Clause itself does not automatically conflict with all state regula-
tion of federal land." In the absence of a clear conflict, federal
preemption of state law occurs "[i]f Congress evidences an intent
to occupy a given field."m Such intent may be either express, ac-
cording to which Congress has clearly prohibited the action of
state or local regulation within a given area of law,24 or implied,
according to which Congress assumes such total control in a given
area as to preclude the operation of state legislation. 2
Because federal statutes affecting management of the public
lands tend to promote rather than discourage cooperation among
federal, state, and local regulatory agencies, express preemption
seldom occurs in public land law.2 6 Among the policies and goals
of NEPA, for instance, is the stated purpose to work "in coopera-
tion with State and local governments." NEPA further provides
that "local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce
environmental standards" have the right to comment on proposed
federal actions.2us Accordingly, the regulations implementing
NEPA establish that "[a]gencies shall cooperate with State and lo-
cal agencies to the fullest extent possible to reduce duplication be-
tween NEPA and State and local requirements." 9 Such coopera-
tion includes joint planning processes, environmental research and
studies, joint public hearings, joint environmental assessments, and
joint environmental impact statements.2 90 Because NEPA applies
to all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
282. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 580 (1987).
283. Id. at 581 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 247
(1984)).
284. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 5195 530-32 (1976) (holding that
explicit language in the Federal Meat Inspection Act preempts inconsistent state la-
beling requirements).
285. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)
(stating that preemption occurs when "the nature of the regulated subject matter
permits no other conclusion, or that Congress has unmistakably so ordained").
286. COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 22, § 5.03(1)(a). One exception occurs in
the Endangered Species Act, which voids any state law or regulation that imposes
more lenient restrictions on the importation and exportation of threatened and en-
dangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f) (1994).
287. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1994).
288. Id § 4332(2)(c).
289. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.2(b) (1995).
290. Id § 1506.2(b)-(c).
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the human environment, ' '211 its impact upon federal management
of the public lands is substantial. Similar language in FLPMA re-
quires the BLM to "coordinate... land use inventory, planning,
and management activities" with state and local government
agencies;29 and regulations implementing NFMA direct the USFS
to coordinate its planning efforts with local governments.2 3 Far
from excluding local governments, federal public land legislation
and regulation encourage their participation.
Such participation has limits, however, and although federal
agencies are obligated to listen to local governments, they are not
necessarily obligated to obey them.294 The same provision in
FLPMA that requires coordination between state and federal
land-use planning and management programs also provides that
"[l]and use plans of the Secretary... shall be consistent with State
and local plans to the maximum extent he finds consistent with Fed-
eral law and the purposes of this Act."295
In California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co.,296 the
United States Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue of
preemption in the context of federal management of the public
lands and ruled that federal land-use regulation of the national
forests did not preempt the enforcement of state environmental
regulations. Citing provisions in FLPMA and NFMA that regulate
mining in the national forests, the Court made a distinction be-
tween land-use and environmental controls.297 Apart from this
distinction, the Court also stated, "[f]or purposes of this discussion
and without deciding this issue, we may assume that the combina-
tion of the NFMA and the FLPMA pre-empts the extension of
state land use plans onto unpatented mining claims in national for-
est lands."293 However, "[c]onsidering the legislative understand-
ing of environmental regulation and land use planning as distinct
activities, it would be anomalous to maintain that Congress in-
tended any state environmental regulation of unpatented mining
claims in national forests to be per se pre-empted as an impermis-
291. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1994).
292. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (1994).
293. 36 C.F.R. § 219.7(d) (1995).
294. See Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 596 (Powell, J., dissenting).
295. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (1994) (emphasis added).
296. 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
297. Id. at 587.
298. Id. at 585.
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sible exercise of state land use planning."29
By declining to decide the issue of whether federal public
land-use legislation preempts local control over the public lands,
the Court did little to clarify the situation. By indicating at the
same time that state environmental laws are specifically not pre-
empted by federal public land-use statutes, the Court has indicated
a willingness to entertain the possibility of some measure of local
control over the public lands that adherents to the County Su-
premacy movement have not been slow to exploit.3 '0  Far from
validating any set of conditions that may qualify as something
other than land-use controls, however,30 ' the Court in Granite Rock
merely delineated a narrow category of state environmental regu-
lations for which it found no intent on the part of Congress to pre-
empt.
3 2
In any event, the court in Boundary Backpackers avoided the
issue raised in Granite Rock by finding that several provisions in
the Boundary County ordinance are in direct conflict with federal
public land-use law. Specifically, the court ruled that the require-
ment that federal agencies maintain parity in land ownership status
within the county violates the Wild and Scenic River Act33
(WSRA) "authorizing the Secretary of the Interior and the Secre-
tary of Agriculture to acquire land within the boundaries of any
component of the wild and scenic rivers system;'34 FLPMA,
"authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to 'acquire... by pur-
chase, exchange, donation or eminent domain, lands or interests
therein;' 35 and NFMA "authorizing the Department of Agricul-
ture to 'acquire land, or interest therein, by purchase, exchange or
299. Id. at 588.
300. See Rene Erm II, Comment, The "Wise-Use" Movement: The Constitutional-
ity of Local Action on Federal Lands Under the Preemption Doctrine, 30 IDAHO L.
REV. 631, 658-59 (1994) (arguing that under the Granite Rock "test," the Boundary
County ordinance is not preempted as long as "there exists a set of conditions that
would not prohibit a land use permissible under federal legislation").
301. See, e.g., id. at 659 (arguing that the requirement in the Boundary County
ordinance conditioning further federal acquisition of land in the county upon main-
tenance of parity in public and private ownership status could avoid preemption be-
cause it does not regulate land use, but only impacts land transfer).
302. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 583 ("[T]he Forest Service [environmental] regu-
lations ... not only are devoid of any expression of intent to pre-empt state law, but
rather appear to assume that those submitting plans of operations will comply with
state laws.").
303. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1994).
304. Boundary Backpackers, 913 P.2d at 1147 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1277 (1994)).
305. Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1715(a) (1994)).
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otherwise, as may be necessary to carry out its authorized
work.' 3 .6 The requirement that federal agencies must submit to
county approval prior to implementing proposed changes in land
use violates portions of the ESA, "which requires the Secretary of
the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce to develop and im-
plement recovery plans for endangered species."3 7 The require-
ment that federal agencies coordinate the designation of wild and
scenic rivers with the county water use plan further violates
WSRA,08 and the prohibition against wilderness areas in the
county violates the Wilderness Act.3 9 The court declared in no
uncertain terms that "[n]one of the federal land laws give local
governmental units this type of veto power over decisions by fed-
eral agencies charged with managing federal land .... This veto
power stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full pur-
poses and objectives Congress evidenced in these federal laws."31
Although the opinion in Boundary Backpackers is binding
only within the borders of Idaho, the effect of such a strong decla-
ration against the constitutionality of the Boundary County ordi-
nance cannot but have reverberations throughout the entire
County Supremacy movement. Here again, the effect of the Prop-
erty Clause of the Constitution has been to reaffirm that, absent a
clear expression of intent to the contrary, Congress retains sole
discretion over the disposition of the public domain, and state and
local governments have no authority to dictate to the federal
agencies responsible for administering public lands what they may
and may not do in discharging their duties under federal law, "any
thing in the... laws of any state to the contrary notwithstand-
ing.",
311
B. The Equal Footing Doctrine
County ordinances that invoke the equal footing doctrine to
assert local control over the public lands are equally problematic.
The federal government has, in fact, successfully challenged one
such ordinance in federal district court.312 Following the attempt
306. Id. (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 428a (1994)).
307. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0 (1994)).
308. Id. at 1147-48 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1275-1276 (1994)).
309. Id. at 1148 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994)).
310. Id. at 1147.
311. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
312. United States v. Nye County, 920 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Nev. 1996).
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by Nye County Commissioner Richard Carver to reopen the Jef-
ferson Canyon Road through the Toiyabe National Forest,313 the
United States filed suit against the county, seeking a declaratory
judgement to invalidate the Nye County resolutions from which
Carver derived authority for his actions. 14
The resolution primarily at issue in Nye County maintains,
pursuant to Nevada statute,315 that federal jurisdiction extends only
to those lands specifically granted to the federal government under
Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution.3 6 The resolu-
tion states as its justification that
313. See supra text accompanying note 1.
314. Nye County, 920 F. Supp. at 1110. Carver claimed to be acting pursuant to
Nye County, Nev., Bd. of Comm'rs Resolution No. 93-49 (Dec. 7, 1993). Among
other provisions, the resolution states,
Whereas, the title to the public lands passed to the State of Nevada
under the equal footing doctrine upon Nevada's admission into the Union
in 1864 ....
All ways, pathways, trails, roads, county highways, and similar public
travel corridors across public lands in Nye County, Nevada, whether estab-
lished by usage or mechanical means, whether passable by foot, beast of
burden, carts or wagons, or motorized vehicles of each and every sort,
whether currently passable or impassable, that was [sic] established in the
past, present, or may be established in the future, on public lands in Nye
County, are hereby declared Nye County Public Roads.
Id.
More significant, however, is Nye County, Nev., Bd. of Comm'rs Resolution
No. 93-48 (Dec. 7, 1993), which states that "Nye County in cooperation with the
State of Nevada, is the public land management authority within the borders of Nye
County on all public lands." Id.
315. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 321.596-321.599 (Michie 1994). This statute, ac-
cording to which Nevada claims ownership of all unappropriated public lands within
its borders, initiated the Sagebrush Rebellion in 1979 when a number of western
states enacted legislation to assert control over the public lands. John D. Leshy, Un-
raveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics, and Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 317 (1980). Although "Nevada now concedes that its statutory claim is legally
untenable," Nye County, 920 F. Supp. at 1113, the United States amended its com-
plaint in Nye County to join Nevada as a defendant. Id. at 1112. Interestingly, the
Nye County resolution claims to control more land than Nevada claims to own under
state statute. "For example, while Nevada does not claim ownership of the national
forests, Nye County has asserted that Nevada owns the lands managed by the De-
partment of Agriculture." Id. at 1111.
316. Nye County, Nev., Bd. of Comm'rs Resolution No. 93-48 (Dec. 7, 1993). The
Article I clause grants Congress the power
[t]o exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district
... as may ... become the seat of government... and to exercise like
authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the
state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arse-
nals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
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the only enumerated power of the Constitution that al-
lows the Federal Government to own and regulate land
within the border of a state is found in Article I of the
United States Constitution ....
Article IV of the United States Constitution,
"The Property Clause," grants Congress complete power
to dispose of and regulate land and property within the
territory before it becomes a state, and...
... [T]he title to the public lands passed to the State
of Nevada under the equal footing doctrine upon Ne-
vada's admission to the Union in 1864.317
The equal footing doctrine, upon which this resolution de-
pends, consists of two separate but interrelated arguments. The
first is the so-called "classic property clause doctrine, '3 8 according
to which the Article IV Property Clause, under which Congress as-
serts control over the public lands, "is not a grant of power to gov-
ern federal land once that land is included within a state. 3 1 9 As a
result, "[t]he classic doctrine.., resolves into an equal footing ar-
gument: because the federal government had no [ownership or
control] over land as land in the original thirteen states, the pres-
ence of either in the new states violates equal footing.,
32
The fundamental premise underlying the classic property
clause doctrine is that there are two separate provisions in the
Constitution that address the jurisdiction of Congress over federal
land.321 The first provision, in Article I of the Constitution, grants
Congress exclusive jurisdiction over specific lands acquired within
the borders of the various states "by the consent of the legislature
of the state within which the same shall be., 322 The second provi-
sion is Article IV of the Constitution which, although it confers on
Congress the "power to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to
317. Nye County, Nev., Bd. of Comm'rs Resolution No. 93-48 (Dec. 7,1993).
318. Dale D. Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, 63 DENV.
U. L. REv. 495 (1986).
319. Id. at 496-97.
320. Id. at 497.
321. Id. at 496 ("For proponents of the classic doctrine, the presence of two
clauses is decisive.").
322. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17.
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the United States,"323 does not grant Congress exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the public lands. As a result, advocates of the classic
property clause doctrine maintain that "[b]ecause the article I
clause preempts all state laws, the article IV clause must therefore
lack preemptive effect.,
324
As further support for theirposition, classic property clause
theorists cite Pollard v. Hagan25 in which the Supreme Court
stated that "the United States have no constitutional capacity to
exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain,
within the limits of a state or elsewhere, except in the cases in
which it is expressly granted., 326 The Court went on to state that
under Article I of the Constitution,
[w]ithin the District of Columbia, and the other places
purchased and used for the purposes... mentioned, the
national and municipal powers of government, of every
description, are united in the government of the union.
And these are the only cases, within the United States, in
which all the powers of government are united in a single
government.
What this says, however, is nothing more than that the federal
government has exclusive jurisdiction over those lands within state
borders described in Article I of the Constitution. It does not say
that Congress lacks jurisdiction over those lands within state bor-
ders described in Article IV of the Constitution. The classic prop-
erty clause doctrine thus sets up a false dichotomy, interpreting the
absence of exclusive jurisdiction over lands within state borders to
mean the absence of all jurisdiction over lands within state bor-
ders.3  The weakness of the classic property clause doctrine is fur-
ther apparent from subsequent case law, which recognizes that
federal authority over the public lands, though not exclusive, does
have preemptive force.329
323. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
324. Goble, supra note 318, at 496.
325. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); see Goble, supra note 315, at 502.
326. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223.
327. Id.
328. See Goble, supra note 318, at 500 n.27 ("The negation of complete preemptive
power is incomplete preemptive power instead of no preemptive power.").
329. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976) ("Absent consent
or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within its terri-
tory, but Congress equally surely retains the power to enact legislation respecting
those lands pursuant to the Property Clause."); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S.
343, 346 (1918) ("The police power of the State extends over the federal public do-
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Pollard v. Hagan is also cited for the proposition that, under
the equal footing doctrine, title to lands held by the federal gov-
ernment tranfers to new states upon their admission as an attribute
of sovereignty."' In holding that title to formerly submerged land
in Alabama passed according to state rather than federal law, the
Court in Pollard v. Hagan stated,
Alabama is, therefore, entitled to the sovereignty and ju-
risdiction over all the territory within her limits.., to the
same extent that Georgia possessed it before she ceded it
to the United States. To maintain any other doctrine, is
to deny that Alabama has been admitted into the union
on an equal footing with the original states.331
However, citing English common law as applied by the Supreme
Court in Martin v. Waddell's Lessee,33 the only lands over which
the Court recognized state sovereignty were "the navigable waters
and soils under them."333 Moreover, under the holding in Martin v.
Waddell's Lessee, the submerged lands passed to the people of
each state upon admission to the union "for their own common
use, ' 334 and thus as a "public trust ... requiring the sovereign to
hold the navigable waters and submerged lands open for public ac-
cess." 335 At the same time, the Supreme Court has not held "that
the original thirteen states gained title to the dry lands as a public
trust... to hold in common for all people." 36 More importantly,
"the Supreme Court has held that title to lands that are not sub-
merged,... including dry and fast lands, did not pass to the states
upon admission., 337 The Supreme Court has instead maintained
not only that title to land underlying non-navigable waters remains
main, at least when there is no legislation by Congress on the subject.").
330. See Nye County, Nev., Bd. of Comm'rs Resolution No. 93-48 (Dec. 7, 1993);
Nye County, 920 F. Supp. at 1115-16; Goble, supra note 318, at 502-03.
331. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 228-29.
332. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
[W]hen the revolution took place, the people of each state became them-
selves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their
navigable waters, and the soils under them, for their own common use,
subject only to the rights since surrendered by the constitution to the gen-
eral government.
Id. at 410.
333. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 229.
334. Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410.
335. Nye County, 920 F. Supp. at 1116.
336. Id
337. Id.
[Vol. 30:275
LAW WEST OF THE PECOS
vested in the United States,3 38 but also that title to dry lands does
not pass to the states upon admission.339 Accordingly, the court in
Nye County determined that "the entire weight of the Supreme
Court's decisions requires a finding that title to the federal public
lands within Nye County did not pass to the State of Nevada upon
its admission pursuant to the equal footing doctrine."
'
30
V. CONCLUSION
Throughout our nation's history, the management of the pub-
lic domain has been directed primarily toward the exploitation of
the vast natural wealth that the public lands afford. It is only
within the last twenty years that Congress has sought to reverse
decades of virtually unrestricted access to the public domain and
to protect the public lands from the serious environmental degra-
dation that such access has entailed. Even now, "statutory man-
dates and BLM protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, live-
stock grazing remains the first priority of BLM range manage-
ment, with environmental protection and alternative land uses
relegated to a distant secondary role."34' Still, even such limited
interference with what some people consider to be their personal
right to expropriate our national heritage is more than they can
bear.
When the dust settles, the Wise-Use movement will have
amounted to little more than a great deal of sound and fury. By
seeking legal solutions to what is essentially a political issue,M2
Wise-Use adherents have thus far expended considerable re-
sources to achieve virtually nothing of substance. Absent the un-
likely prospect that Congress will readjust federal land-use policy,
the fundamental relationship between state and federal control
over the public lands will remain unchanged, and the only possible
accomplishment of which Wise-Use adherents might boast is that
they may possibly have temporarily forestalled further attempts by
the federal government to redress some of the continuing inequi-
338. Id (citing United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935)).
339. Id. (citing Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229 (1913)).
340. I at 1117.
341. Joseph M. Feller, What Is Wrong with the BLM's Management of Livestock
Grazing on the Public Lands?, 30 IDAHO L. REv. 555,557 (1994).
342. See Leshy, supra note 315, at 325 n.23 (arguing in the context of the Sage-
brush Rebellion that state governments have chosen to seek solutions in the courts
instead of the political process at a time when their influence in Congress has never
been greater).
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ties in the administration of the public lands. Local authorities al-
ready possess, but fail to exercise, many of the rights they seek to
obtain. Federal agencies are currently subject to extensive re-
quirements to coordinate their management of the public lands
with local governments,343 and under federal law for most, if not
all, of the western states, local governments have standing to force
federal agencies to comply with their own procedural require-
ments.3 4
Now that many of the underlying legal theories upon which
the Wise-Use movement has sought to advance its claims have met
with defeat in the courts, perhaps it is time for local governments
to sit down with federal regulators to fashion workable solutions to
satisfy the needs of local communities as well as to protect the
public lands from environmental degradation. Such an approach
has now been adopted in Catron County and in neighboring Lin-
coln County, New Mexico, where County Supremacy ordinances
were repealed in favor of memoranda of understanding according
to which federal agencies and local officials have agreed to work
together to achieve common objectives.345 Insofar, however, as
adherents to the Wise-Use movement seek instead to subvert the
political process by means of specious legal arguments designed
primarily to intimidate opponents into submitting to their self-
interested world view, they are performing a disservice to them-
selves and to our nation. In their attempt to fight what they char-
acterize as efforts by the federal government to lock away the
public lands from the people, a minority of citizens are, in actual-
ity, attempting to lock the federal lands away from the use and
enjoyment of the majority of the American public in order to pro-
mote their own commercial exploitation of public resources for
private gain. The public lands are the property of all the people of
the United States and not of a self-appointed few. It is therefore
the duty of our government to manage these lands in such a way
"that will best meet the present and future needs of the American
people."' 4 To the extent that the Wise-Use movement hinders this
343. See supra notes 286-93 and accompanying text.
344. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995).
345. Miller, supra note 168, at 839; Lavelle, supra note 1, at A22; see also Matthew
Hilton, Defending the Right of Local Governments to Contribute to Local Decision
Making Regarding Public Lands in the Western United States, 27 URB. LAw. 267, 289
(1995) (recommending wording for a model county ordinance and memorandum of
understanding to address the concerns of state and federal public land-use policies).
346. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1994).
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goal and continues to constitute a serious threat to the preserva-
tion of our national heritage, "[s]omething must be done to rem-
edy this evil." 347
Patrick Austin Perry*
347. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1845) (statement of Rep. Ficklin).
* This Comment is dedicated to my wife, Hsiao-ling, and to our daughters,
Esm6, Elene, and Eisha, in loving appreciation for their indulgence. In addition, I
wish to acknowledge the influence of Professor Francis Oakley, from whose teaching
I have developed a profound respect for law as a product of the human reason, and
of Judge Roy Bean, from whose example I have developed a profound respect for
law as a product of the human imagination.
November 1996]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:275
